Lilliburlero

Vorrei cominciare con un’immagine. Una scena del film Barry Lyndon, diretto da Stanley Kubrick. Sullo sfondo nebbioso di una campagna Europea del diciottesimo secolo, la voce fuori campo introduce l’avanzata delle giacche rosse inglesi contro la retroguardia francese, asserragliata in un frutteto. ‘Though this encounter is not recorded in any history books, it was memorable enough for those who took part.’ Secondo lo stile militare dell’epoca, la fanteria marcia lungo il prato, in file orizzontali e parallele. I Francesi sono disposti anch’essi in file, le prime inginocchiate, le seconde in piedi, le terze pronte a ricaricare i fucili. L’avanzata è lenta, estenuante, al suono dei flauti che intonano il Lilliburlero. Come direbbe il personaggio di Vincent Cassel in una banlieue di vari secoli dopo, ‘il problema non è la caduta, ma l’atterraggio’. E qui, l’atterraggio e la caduta quasi si fondono. I fanti inglesi avanzano, a passi cadenzati. Le truppe Francesi restano immobili, prendono la mira. I fanti mantengono il passo. I Francesi attendono l’ordine dei superiori. I fanti proseguono. L’ordine arriva. Fuoco. Le prime file della fanteria inglese cadono decimate. Le seconde file, imperturbabili, prendono il posto dei caduti. La marcia continua. Le truppe francesi ricaricano i fucili. Fuoco. Il prato si riempie di cadaveri vestiti in divise rosse. Le terze file si fanno avanti di nuovo. La marcia prosegue, lentissima. Fuoco.
 

Talk at KAFCA conference, Barcelona 2/12/2011

This piece derives in part from an article I wrote in October 2011, titled Recurring Dreams: the red heart of fascism. In that article, I tried to analyze two different types of debt (the money-debt and the life-debt) in the light of the history of Western capitalism and of the current financial crisis. Also, I drew a number of comparisons between the current European/American situation and the one experienced during the inter-war period by those countries defeated in WWI. I attempted to warn of a recurrence of the breeding times of fascism/nazism, in which people’s exasperation for the devastating effects of a debt crisis risks turning into the desire for a higher authority to take absolute control and impose a new order. Finally, I warned of the ‘red’ – that is, left-wing, social – core of the early 20th century versions of fascism and nazism, and I identified similar desires in vast strata of today’s left.
 
Since I wrote that text, however, things have changed. With the rise of unelected, technocratic governments in Italy and Greece, with the deepening of the crisis and the enforcement of even more austerity measures, with the waves of occupations and repression in countless countries, and, most notably, with the umpteenth split in the left, the set of dangers and opportunities, I believe, has changed. To the risk of fascism, still present in the hearts of many, especially on the populist fringes, I would like to add that of authoritarian social capitalism. To the opportunity of revolutionary politics, I would like to add that of prefigurative-politics and of anarchist reformism.
 

El Gobierno de Nadie (una pesadilla)

 “Consideramos un gobierno tecnocrático de unidad nacional la mejor opción para llevar a cabo las reformas y mantener la confianza de los inversores, con una composición que abarque izquierda y derecha del espectro político y cuente con líderes de confianza (…) Luchando como están las democracias modernas maduras con la crisis de la deuda soberana, los gobiernos tecnocráticos, ‘apolíticos’, pueden ser una opción imperiosa, conforme decae la confianza pública en los políticos, se afianza la resistencia a las reformas estructurales y los partidos sienten pavor por las consecuencias en las urnas de aplicar reformas dolorosas” (Tina Fordham, Citigroup)
 
A diario suceden mil cosas, pero ¿cómo descifrar cuáles son señales de las transformaciones que vienen? ¿Cuáles son huellas o ecos del pasado, y cuáles anuncian tendencias sociales decisivas? ¿Cómo saber cuándo hemos traspasado un umbral histórico? Me lo he preguntado estos días pensando sobre los “gobiernos técnicos” que se han impuesto en Grecia e Italia. Los veo como signos de muy mal agüero, fórmulas en experimentación que podrían luego reproducirse, rápido. Prototipos.
 

The Right to Insolvency and the Disentanglement of the General Intellect's Potency

Austerity in Europe
 
"The German worker does not want to pay the Greek fisherman's bills," the fanatics of economic fundamentalism are saying, while pitting workers against workers and leading Europe to the brink of civil war.
 
The entity that is "Europe" was conceived in the aftermath of the Second World War as a project to overcome modern nationalism and create a non-identitarian union based on principles of humanism, enlightenment, and social justice. What is left of this original project, after the recent financial collapse that has stormed the American economy and jeopardized the Eurozone? Since the beginning of the European Union, the constitutional profile of the European entity has been weakly defined, such that economic goals of prosperity and monetarist financial constraints have taken the place of a constitution. In the 1990s, the Maastricht Treaty marked a turning point in this process. It sanctioned the constitutionalization of monetarist rule and its economic implications: a decrease in social spending, cuts in labor costs and an increase in competition and productivity. The effects of a narrow application of the Maastricht rules became evident in 2010: overwhelming Greece and Ireland and endangering other countries, the financial crisis exposed the contradictions between the desires for economic growth, social stability, and monetarist rigidity. In this situation, the Maastricht rules have been shown to be dangerous, and the overall conception of the EU, based on the centrality of economic competition, has revealed its frailty.
 
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